Tracking reason : proof, consequence, and truth
Azzouni, Jody · Oxford New York : Oxford University Press, 2006
- Publisher
- Oxford New York : Oxford University Press, 2006
- Physical description
- 248 pages
- ISBN
- 019518713X (acid-free paper)
- Dewey classification
- 511.36
- Language
- English
Summary
"Ordinary people - mathematicians among them - grasp when they take something to follow (deductively) from something ease. This is the backbone of our self-ascribed ability to reason. This book investigates the connection between that ordinary notion of consequence and the formal analogues developed by logicians. One crucial claim of the book is that, despite our apparent intuitive grasp of when something follows from something else, we have no introspective access to the rules by which we reason, nor to the scope and range of the domain, as it were, of our reasoning. The point is illustrated with a close analysis of a paradigmatic case of ordinary reasoning: mathematical proof."--BOOK JACKET
Digital copy
Catalogue record
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| 001Control number | 19969 |
| 003Control number identifier | OCoLC |
| 005Date and time of latest transaction | 23 Jan 2006, 02:14 |
| 008Fixed-length data elements | 060123s2006 enk 001 0 eng |
| 010Library of Congress control number | 2005040565 |
| 015National bibliography number | GBA581534 bnb |
| 020International Standard Book Number (ISBN) | 019518713X (acid-free paper) |
| 041Language code | eng |
| 042Authentication code | pcc |
| 050Library of Congress call number | QA9.54 .A99 2006 |
| 082Dewey Decimal call number | 511.36 22 |
| 100Main entry – personal name | Azzouni, Jody. |
| 245Title statement | Tracking reason : proof, consequence, and truth / Jody Azzouni. |
| 260Publication, distribution, etc. (imprint) | Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2006 |
| 300Physical description | vi, 248 p. ; 25 cm. |
| 504Bibliography, etc. note | Includes bibliographical references (p. 231-238) and index. |
| 520Summary, etc. | "Ordinary people - mathematicians among them - grasp when they take something to follow (deductively) from something ease. This is the backbone of our self-ascribed ability to reason. This book investigates the connection between that ordinary notion of consequence and the formal analogues developed by logicians. One crucial claim of the book is that, despite our apparent intuitive grasp of when something follows from something else, we have no introspective access to the rules by which we reason, nor to the scope and range of the domain, as it were, of our reasoning. The point is illustrated with a close analysis of a paradigmatic case of ordinary reasoning: mathematical proof."--BOOK JACKET. |
| 650Subject added entry – topical term |
|
| 999Collection | Downloads |
=001 19969=003 OCoLC=005 20060123021438.0=008 060123s2006 enk 001 0 eng=010 ##$a2005040565=015 ##$aGBA581534 $2bnb=020 ##$a019518713X (acid-free paper)=041 0#$aeng=042 ##$apcc=050 00$aQA9.54 $b.A99 2006=082 00$a511.36 $222=092 ##$a511.36 $bA9=100 1#$aAzzouni, Jody.=245 10$aTracking reason : $bproof, consequence, and truth / $cJody Azzouni.=260 ##$aOxford ; $aNew York : $bOxford University Press, $c2006=300 ##$avi, 248 p. ; $c25 cm.=504 ##$aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 231-238) and index.=520 1#$a"Ordinary people - mathematicians among them - grasp when they take something to follow (deductively) from something ease. This is the backbone of our self-ascribed ability to reason. This book investigates the connection between that ordinary notion of consequence and the formal analogues developed by logicians. One crucial claim of the book is that, despite our apparent intuitive grasp of when something follows from something else, we have no introspective access to the rules by which we reason, nor to the scope and range of the domain, as it were, of our reasoning. The point is illustrated with a close analysis of a paradigmatic case of ordinary reasoning: mathematical proof."--BOOK JACKET.=650 #0$aLogic, Symbolic and mathematical.=650 #0$aProof theory.=970 11$l1 $tTruth and truth conditions $p13=970 11$l2 $tThe transcendence of truth $p37=970 11$l3 $tAnaphorically unrestricted quantifiers $p60=970 11$l4 $tRegimentation and paradox $p74=970 11$l5 $tThe inconsistency of natural languages $p92=970 11$l6 $tThe uniqueness of mathematics as a social practice $p123=970 11$l7 $tThe derivation-indicator view of mathematical practice $p140=970 11$l8 $tHow to nominalize formalism $p168=970 11$l9 $tSemantics and the notion of consequence $p194=LDR 02144cam a22004094a 4500

