Understanding people : normativity and rationalizing explanation
Millar, Alan, Ph. D · Oxford : Clarendon Press New York : Oxford University Press, 2004
- Publisher
- Oxford : Clarendon Press New York : Oxford University Press, 2004
- Physical description
- 262 pages
- ISBN
- 0199254400
- Dewey classification
- 128
- Language
- English
Summary
"Alan Millar examines our understanding of why people think and act as they do. His key theme is that normative considerations form an indispensable part of the explanatory framework in terms of which we seek to understand each other. Millar defends the idea that normativity is linked to reasons. On this basis he examines the structure of certain normative commitments incurred by having propositional attitudes. Controversially, he argues that ascriptions of beliefs and intentions in and of themselves attribute normative commitments and that this has implications for the psychology of believing and intending. Indeed, all propositional attitudes of the sort we ascribe to people have a normative dimension, since possessing the concepts that the attitudes implicate is of its very nature commitment-incurring. The ramifications of these views for our understanding of people is explored. Millar offers illuminating discussions of reasons for belief and reasons for action
the explanation of beliefs and actions in terms of the subject's reasons
the idea that simulation has a key role in understanding people
and the limits of explanation in terms of propositional attitudes. He compares and contrasts the commitments incurred by propositional attitudes with those incurred by participating in practices, arguing that the former should not be assimilated to the latter." "Understanding People will be of great interest to most philosophers of mind, as well as to those working on practical and theoretical reasoning."--BOOK JACKET
Digital copy
Catalogue record
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| 001Control number | 19947 |
| 003Control number identifier | OCoLC |
| 005Date and time of latest transaction | 16 Sep 2004, 19:05 |
| 008Fixed-length data elements | 040917s2004 enk 001 0 eng |
| 015National bibliography number | GBA4-X4571 |
| 020International Standard Book Number (ISBN) | 0199254400 : £40.0 |
| 040Cataloging source |
|
| 041Language code | eng |
| 050Library of Congress call number | BD450 .M54 200 |
| 082Dewey Decimal call number | 128 2 |
| 100Main entry – personal name | Millar, Alan, Ph. D |
| 245Title statement | Understanding people : normativity and rationalizing explanation / Alan Millar |
| 260Publication, distribution, etc. (imprint) | Oxford : Clarendon Press ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2004 |
| 300Physical description | xvi, 262 p. ; 24 cm |
| 504Bibliography, etc. note | Includes bibliographical references (p. [248]-257) and index |
| 520Summary, etc. | "Alan Millar examines our understanding of why people think and act as they do. His key theme is that normative considerations form an indispensable part of the explanatory framework in terms of which we seek to understand each other. Millar defends the idea that normativity is linked to reasons. On this basis he examines the structure of certain normative commitments incurred by having propositional attitudes. Controversially, he argues that ascriptions of beliefs and intentions in and of themselves attribute normative commitments and that this has implications for the psychology of believing and intending. Indeed, all propositional attitudes of the sort we ascribe to people have a normative dimension, since possessing the concepts that the attitudes implicate is of its very nature commitment-incurring. The ramifications of these views for our understanding of people is explored. Millar offers illuminating discussions of reasons for belief and reasons for action; the explanation of beliefs and actions in terms of the subject's reasons; the idea that simulation has a key role in understanding people; and the limits of explanation in terms of propositional attitudes. He compares and contrasts the commitments incurred by propositional attitudes with those incurred by participating in practices, arguing that the former should not be assimilated to the latter." "Understanding People will be of great interest to most philosophers of mind, as well as to those working on practical and theoretical reasoning."--BOOK JACKET |
| 650Subject added entry – topical term |
|
| 999Collection | Downloads |
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